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Many authors have noted that wisdom is making a comeback, after 
being associated for a long time with old people, tradition, and 
conservative caution in a culture of youth, modernization, innovation, 
and risky exploration. The revival of wisdom is especially evident in 
areas where knowledge and (technical) knowhow come up against 
questions of ethics, values, beauty, the shaping and flourishing of the 
whole person, the common good, and long-term perspectives.1 As will 
become clear throughout this paper, the resurgence of wisdom can be 
explained as a reaction against the negative effects of the dominance of 
scientific rationality, which boasts of its objectivity and its independence 
from ethical and existential considerations. Many people ask themselves 
“how the modern world can retrieve a wisdom, i.e. a knowledge, a 
conscience that is not only based on objects of knowledge, but relies also 
on life itself as it is lived daily, on a way of living and existing?”2 
From a broader, historical and cross-cultural perspective, the 
unilateral focus on scientific rationality in the West is rather exceptional. 
Religious and secular traditions around the world, from Hinduism over 
the mythologies of ancient Egypt and Greece to those of Northern 
Europe, from Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, over Zoroastrian-
ism to Judaism and Christianity, abound with revelations of wisdom. 
These traditions have permeated the history of humankind with stories 
and legends about and sayings of wise men and women. This becomes 
e.g. apparent from the eight “immortals” in ancient China, the seven 
sages of Greece and Rome, the wise men from the East who came to 
adore the child Jesus,3 the rishis of India, and the five Sufi sages in the 
Islam. Finally, and on a more implicit level, there is a lot of wisdom 
                                                             
1  David Ford, Christian Wisdom. Desiring God and Learning in Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 1. 
2 Pierre Hadot, “La figure du sage dans l’Antiquité gréco-latine,” in Idem, 
Discours et mode de vie philosophique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2014), p. 176. 
3 For Barton, the adoration of Jesus by the magi is a paradigmatic story of the 
quest of the nations for wisdom and of the revelation of true wisdom in a place, 
where no-one expected it. See: Stephen C. Barton, “Gospel Wisdom,” in Where 
Shall Wisdom Be Found? Wisdom in the Bible, the Church and the Contem-
porary World, ed. Stephen C. Barton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), p. 95. 
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present in the literature of all cultures of the world.4 In our days too, 
people are often taking the advice of wise people and words of 
traditional wisdom to heart when making difficult existential decisions 
or simply in giving orientation to their lives. 
These examples show that, in all cultures around the world, wisdom 
is bound up with bodies of tradition, which are preserved, adapted and 
passed on by wise people to the new generations. In sum, wisdom strikes 
us as an extraordinary kind of knowledge, resting on human experience, 
but also having a divine origin. Moreover, wisdom is not a purely 
theoretical affair, but rather a spiritual way of life, consisting in a 
combination of theoretical insight in divine, i.e. eternal and 
unchangeable truths (the Greek word “theoria” means “beholding the 
divine”), and practical and political knowhow. This way of life is the 
object of an education in a school of wisdom by a master, whom the 
pupils see as the transcendent norm of this way of life.5 
When we focus on the development of wisdom in ancient Greek 
philosophy, it turns out that the introduction of the word “philosophy,” 
in the fourth century BC, meant a decisive turn in the understanding of 
the sage, and brought about a deep suspicion against all pretended 
incarnations of wisdom in the sage. In particular, people became aware 
of the superhuman character of true wisdom, and the immense distance 
that separates their ordinary wisdom from divine wisdom.6 Plato makes 
a sharp distinction between the perfect knowledge of the Gods, who 
possess true wisdom, and humans, who can only strive for wisdom.7 One 
of the consequences of this evolution was that wisdom came to be 
identified more and more with “epistèmè,” i.e. with a certain and 
rigorous knowledge of eternal and unchangeable things, which comes 
closest to divine knowledge. For Aristotle, ideal wisdom consists of a 
perfect knowhow based on total and certain knowledge, not only of the 
things themselves, but also of their causes and principles.8 By contrast, 
ordinary wisdom, which is compatible with human nature and crucial for 
daily life, is a practical knowhow of things that are by nature contingent 
and changeable. In between these two kinds of wisdom we see the 
emergence of philosophy, which is the essentially human exercise to 
attain divine wisdom.9 
                                                             
4  For a broad, cross-cultural, historical overview of wisdom see Trevor 
Curnow, Wisdom. A History (London: Reaktion Books, 2015). 
5  Hadot, “La figure du sage,” pp. 177f. See also Idem, Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p. 334. 
6 Hadot, “La figure du sage,” p. 178f. 
7 Plato, Symposium 204a f.; Idem, Phaedrus 278d. 
8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I 1, 981b 29. 
9 Hadot, “La figure du sage,” p. 179. 
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Given the intermediate position of philosophy, the task of the 
philosopher consists in the exercise, during her whole life, to become 
wise herself and to describe, in a philosophical discourse, the ideal sage. 
This description constitutes the object of numerous treatises, and is the 
theme of oral practical exercises, aimed at training pupils of wisdom in 
the different philosophical schools. 10  Aristotle gives an excellent 
example of what a truly philosophical way of life is: by leading a life of 
wisdom, the human fulfils her condition in the most superb way, while 
at the same time realizing that wisdom is, because of its divine nature, 
beyond the human condition.11 Since the most superb objects are eternal 
and unchangeable, it is no wonder that, for Aristotle, the highest form of 
wisdom consists in leading a contemplative life. Yet, this example also 
shows that wisdom confronts humans with a paradox: “Wisdom 
corresponds with what is the most essential to man, namely living 
according to reason and spirit, and at the same time it strikes him as 
strange and superhuman.”12 A final important characteristic of leading a 
philosophical life is that practical exercises in wisdom are not something 
added to the philosophical praxis, complementing an abstract theory or 
discourse, but a philosophical life as such has to be conceived as a 
spiritual exercise. These exercises can be defined as “a voluntary, 
personal praxis, meant to realize a transformation of the individual, a 
transformation of the self.” 13  This shows that the final aim of these 
exercises and, hence, of the schools of wisdom, is not so much to inform 
the disciples about philosophical theories and insights, but to (trans)form 
their lives, that is to educate them. 
These characteristics connect the schools of ancient philosophy 
with most religious and secular wisdom-traditions. Their ultimate goal is 
not so much to present a philosophical theory of reality or a religious 
doctrine about the true nature of the divine, but to teach their disciples a 
method and to train them practically to orientate themselves in thinking 
                                                             
10 Ibid., p. 181. 
11  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X 7, 1177b 26ff.: “But such a life [of 
wisdom] would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he 
will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much 
as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is 
the exercise of the other kind of excellence. If intellect is divine, then, in 
comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with 
human life. […] We must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and 
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it 
be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.” 
12 Hadot, “La figure du sage,” p. 186. 
13  Pierre Hadot, La philosophie comme manière de vivre. Entretiens avec 
Jeannie Carlier et Arnold I. Davidson (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), p. 144. See 
also: Idem, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, pp. 276ff. 
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as well as in acting. Hence, the link between ancient philosophy and 
other wisdom traditions is that both are exercises in spiritual ways of 
life.14 
In this paper, I want to draw the attention to an important aspect of 
these spiritual exercises, namely that they educate people in practical 
wisdom. The reason for this choice is that practical wisdom specifically 
deals with contingent human affairs, so that it can be expected to 
contribute to finding a solution to the current crisis of meaning. 
Furthermore, the focus of this paper will be on two very influential 
wisdom traditions or schools of wisdom, namely Aristotle’s philosophy 
and Christian faith. In the next section, I will examine the nature of 
practical wisdom as developed by Aristotle. In particular, the question 
will be how practical wisdom succeeds in establishing a relation 
between universal principles and particular situations, and why this 
relation is inevitably fragile. Next, the role and importance of practical 
wisdom in Christian faith will be shown. The section thereafter critically 
analyses the fate of wisdom in modernity. The final section explores if 
and how a retrieval of practical wisdom can offer a response to the 
ongoing loss of substantial meaning, and how Christian faith can 
contribute to that. 
 
Aristotle’s Idea of Prctical Wisdom 
 
Although, as argued above, ancient philosophers do not separate the 
theoretical aspects of philosophy as a spiritual way of life from the 
practical ones, some of them distinguish between theoretical and 
practical wisdom. In particular, Aristotle defines theoretical wisdom, 
which is its highest expression, as a demonstrative knowledge of the 
universal and necessary principles of all things, which by definition 
cannot be otherwise. Practical wisdom, by contrast, is a true and 
reasoned capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad 
for man, and which are, consequentially, contingent. 15  Therefore, in 
order to qualify as true wisdom and not merely as technical knowhow, 
practical philosophy has to connect this knowhow with a profound 
insight in what is truly good for all humans. This shows that wisdom, 
theoretical as well as practical, is not be identical with an enormous 
amount of factual knowledge, or that a wise person would be someone 
who could give all the correct answers to a hypothetical quiz about 
                                                             
14 For a further exploration of philosophy as a way of life and an analysis of 
Pierre Hadot’s ideas on this topic, see the contribution of Hu Yeping in this 
volume. 
15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I 1, 981b-982b; Idem, Nicomachean Ethics, VI 3-7, 
1139b-1141b. 
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everything. Rather, wise people are those who can see the bigger picture, 
whose horizons are broadest, whose vision is clearest, in other words 
who live in the light.16 
In the case of practical wisdom, there is a crucial additional aspect: 
wise people not only have a broad vision, but also are able to relate it in 
a meaningful way to contingent situations that can be brought about by 
human action. In other words, practical wisdom is a spiritual exercise, 
aimed at giving a proper orientation to human acting. This orientation 
being based on a correct, deliberative assessment of contingent, 
existential situations. In order to examine this aspect of practical wisdom 
in more detail I take Martha Nussbaum’s book, The Fragility of 
Goodness, as my guide.17 Aristotle holds that moral or practical wisdom 
is concerned with the ultimate particular fact, and can therefore never 
become universal knowledge.18 Furthermore, the appropriate criterion of 
correct choice is that the person of practical wisdom is a thoroughly 
human being, i.e. someone who does not attempt to take up a stand 
outside of the conditions of human life, but bases her judgment on a long 
and broad experience of these conditions. 19 This shows that Aristotle 
assumes the meaningfulness and value of our everyday human lives, and 
tries to discover an account of our underlying moral commitments that 
does justice to our moral experience. He does not downplay the 
importance of the common good and the universal moral rules that 
follow from it, but recognizes that these rules cannot and should not be 
conceived as the only standard for moral decision in contingent 
situations. Rather, universal rules are like the leaden ruler of Lesbian 
architecture, which was not rigid but could be adapted to the shape of 
the stone.20 
Moreover, the values that are constitutive of a good human life are 
plural and incommensurable, and therefore they cannot be measured 
univocally, as if morals were a kind of technè. There is no single 
common notion of the good that practical wisdom only needs to apply in 
order to pass a correct moral judgment in specific situations. Instead, the 
best human life should be conceived as a life inclusive of a number of 
different constituents, each being defined apart from each of the others 
and valued for its own sake; each virtue is defined separately, as 
something that has value in itself. To put it concretely: “If I should ask 
of justice and of love whether both are constituent parts of eudaimonia 
                                                             
16 Curnow, Wisdom, p. 10. 
17 Martha Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness. Luck and ethics in Greek 
tragedy and philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
18 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI 8, 1142a 23-4. 
19 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, p. 290. 
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V 10, 1137b 29-32. 
34          Peter Jonkers 
[…], I surely do not imply […] that we are to hold them up to a single 
standard, regarding them as productive of some further value. […] 
Something can be an end in itself and at the same time be a valued 
constituent in a larger or more inclusive end.” To choose a value “for its 
own sake (for the sake of what it itself is) not only does not require, but 
is actually incompatible with, viewing it as qualitatively commensurable 
with other valuable items.”21 
All this means that one cannot give a correct orientation to one’s 
own or someone else’s actions simply by applying principles alone, 
since they fail to capture the fine detail of the concrete particular. The 
particular must be seized in a confrontation with the situation itself, by a 
faculty that is suited to confront the situation as a complex whole.22 This 
faculty is practical wisdom or prudence; its task is to balance the 
universal rule and the particular situation until one reaches a moment of 
equilibrium. In order to do this balancing properly, a wealth of practical 
experience of particular situations is needed, 23  and this cannot be 
provided by general principles as such. Yet, although their usefulness is 
limited, these principles too are essential for practical wisdom. As 
summaries of the wise judgments of others, these principles are 
guidelines in moral education for the pupils of the schools of 
philosophy. On a more general level, these rules guide virtuous adults in 
their approach to the particular, helping them to pick out its salient 
features. When there is no time to formulate a fully concrete decision, 
scrutinizing all the features of the case at hand, it is better to follow a 
good summary rule than to make a hasty and inadequate concrete 
choice. Furthermore, rules give constancy and stability in situations in 
which bias and passion might distort judgment. In sum, rules are 
necessities because we are not always good judges.24 Finally and most 
importantly, “the particular case would be surd and unintelligible 
without the guiding and sorting power of the universal. […] Nor does 
particular judgment have the kind of rootedness and focus required for 
goodness of character without a core of commitment to a general 
conception – albeit one that is continually evolving, ready for surprise, 
                                                             
21 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, p. 297. 
22 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, pp. 300f. 
23 Robert Song, “Wisdom as the End of Morality,” in Where Shall Wisdom Be 
Found?, ed. Stephen C. Barton, pp. 300f. This conclusion is in line with 
Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue: “Moral virtue is a state of character 
concerned with choice, lying in a mean, the mean relative to us, this being 
determined by a logos, the one by which the person of practical wisdom would 
determine it.” See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b36-1107a2. 
24 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, p.304. 
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and not rigid. There is in effect a two-way illumination between 
particular and universal.”25 
The result of the above examination shows in which way practical 
wisdom is indeed a spiritual exercise in the ancient schools of 
philosophy, since it aims at giving a proper orientation to human acting 
on the basis of a correct assessment of particular, contingent situations in 
the light of general moral principles. This means that the person of 
practical wisdom is someone who is educated as a thoroughly human 
being, in particular as someone who realizes that, especially in moral 
matters, a view from nowhere is impossible. What makes the 
deliberations of practical wisdom even more complex is that the 
different virtues do not only not constitute a cohesive whole, but are to a 
certain extent incommensurable, as the never-ending tension between 
the virtues of justice and love illustrates. Yet, these virtues are essential 
because practical wisdom needs them to interpret and orientate human 
life in particular situations. In sum, the exercises of practical wisdom are 
meant to educate people in such a way that they are able to find the right 
balance between the universal rule and the particular situation, and that 





In his book on Christian wisdom, David Ford describes Christianity 
as “at present the largest global wisdom tradition.”27 Characteristic of 
Christian wisdom is that it is God-centered, has the whole of creation as 
its context, is immersed in history and the contemporary world, and is 
constantly sought afresh with others in a community whose basic trust is 
that the Spirit will lead them into further truth. Since Christians believe 
that Jesus is God’s only son, he is not only a teacher of Godly wisdom, 
the title by which he is most frequently addressed and referred to in the 
New Testament, but also wisdom incarnate, a theological claim 
regarding Jesus which first appeared within the early history of the 
transmission and development of the traditions regarding Jesus.28 This 
means that Jesus was not just an enlightened “wisdom teacher,” 
                                                             
25 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness, p.306. 
26 I developed the question of the nature of (Christian) wisdom in more detail 
in: Peter Jonkers, “Serving the World Through Wisdom,” in Envisioning 
Futures for the Catholic Church, eds. Staf Hellemans and Peter Jonkers 
(Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2018), pp. 73-
105. 
27 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p. 2. 
28 James D.G. Dunn, “Jesus: Teacher of Wisdom or Wisdom Incarnate?,” in 
Where Shall Wisdom Be Found?, ed. Stephen C. Barton, pp. 79, 83. 
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memorable for his subversive parables and startling figures of speech, 
since such a reconstruction fails to do justice to the messianic, 
eschatological dimension of Jesus’ kingdom proclamation, and 
overlooks the extent to which the wisdom which Jesus teaches is a 
hidden heavenly wisdom, not reducible to matters of empirical 
observation or existential need. Rather Jesus’ wisdom points to a 
transcendental reality discerned only by faith and in the context of 
obedient discipleship. Christian wisdom is not primarily a matter of 
existential, let alone technical or empirical knowledge, but has much 
more to do with mystery and revelation. It is a manifestation of the 
hidden life of God made known in the life, death and resurrection of the 
Son of God.29 
Christian wisdom is primarily gained from reading scripture alert to 
both its origins, reception, and current interpretations, as well as to 
contemporary understanding and life. Much of scriptural wisdom is 
narrative, i.e. lies in the way the story is told, the narrative pattern and 
detail, the encounters and images, and the key events and statements, as 
becomes manifest in a paradigmatic way in the book of Job and the 
stories about Solomon, as well in the parable of the Good Samaritan. 
The narrative character of scriptural wisdom, and more in general the 
fact that Christian wisdom has its source in God means that it is 
inexhaustible and even elusive, and hence can never be fully grasped by 
a rational interpretation, be it theological or philosophical.30 
The essentially divine character of Christian wisdom explains why 
Paul is so critical of its opposite, namely all manifestations of human or 
worldly wisdom and human’s boasting of it as if it were the result of 
human knowledge alone. Therefore, Paul qualifies all worldly wisdom 
rather as folly in the eyes of God, thereby marking its 
incommensurability with Christian wisdom. In Paul’s view, Jews nor 
Greeks will get the answers they seek, since they ask the wrong 
questions. Only by believing wholeheartedly in the story of Jesus, and 
accepting that one’s whole life is reframed by it, one can become open 
to the revelation of God’s wisdom.31 Beyond doubt, the fact that true 
wisdom can only be reached through God as the radical, personal Other 
and through Jesus as wisdom incarnate, and that wisdom is, eventually, 
                                                             
29 Barton, “Gospel Wisdom,” pp. 108f. 
30 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p. 190. 
31 Richard B. Hays, “Wisdom According to Paul,” in Where Shall Wisdom Be 
Found?, ed. Stephen C. Barton, pp. 122f. See also: Colin Gunton, “Christ, the 
Wisdom of God: A Study in Divine and Human Action,” in Where Shall 
Wisdom Be Found?, ed. Stephen C. Barton, p. 260. 
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the salvific effect of God’s grace distinguish Christian wisdom most 
explicitly from the ancient schools of philosophy.32 
Although these differences are essential, there are also some 
important similarities between Christian wisdom and the wisdom 
schools of ancient philosophy. Just like these schools, Christian wisdom 
is primarily a spiritual exercise, aimed at a transformation or, according 
to the Christian vocabulary, conversion of the self. Furthermore, just like 
in ancient philosophy, the final goal of Christian wisdom is inevitably 
elusive, because the faithful are convinced of the immense distance that 
separates God’s true wisdom from the seeming wisdom of the world. In 
order to overcome this gap to some extent, Christians need spiritual 
exercises under the guidance of a spiritual master. Finally, Christian 
wisdom is not primarily a doctrine of the true nature of the divine, but a 
spiritual way of life that orientates the lives of the faithful, i.e. their 
thinking as well as acting. 
On the basis of the analysis of Aristotle’s conception of practical 
wisdom in previous section, one can ask if and how Christian wisdom 
educates people to deal with the contingencies and particularities of 
individual human lives. A case in point in this respect is Catholic social 
teaching, which manages to relate this aspect of the Christian wisdom 
tradition to the heterogeneous realities of persons, societies, and political 
regimes all over the world. The way, in which Catholic social teaching 
realizes this is by conferring to prudent individuals and groups in society 
the responsibility to establish a balance between the universal rules of 
the Christian wisdom tradition and the particular situations in which 
people live. 
In order to show how this approach works, let us take the social 
encyclical Deus caritas est as an example. It states that “the Church’s 
social doctrine has become a set of fundamental guidelines offering 
approaches that are valid even beyond the confines of the Church: in the 
face of ongoing development these guidelines need to be addressed in 
the context of dialogue with all those seriously concerned for humanity 
and for the world in which we live.”33 This quotation shows, first, the 
ambition of the Catholic Church to orientate the contingent lives of 
contemporary societies on the basis of the universalist principles of 
solidarity, subsidiarity, and human dignity, which are concretizations of 
Christian wisdom, in particular, of the Catholic view on the common 
good. But, second, the Church also recognizes “the autonomy of the 
                                                             
32 Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, pp. 372f. See also Paul van 
Tongeren, “Philosophy as a Form of Spirituality,” in Seeing the Seeker. 
Explorations in the Discipline of Spirituality. A Festschrift for Kees Waaijman, 
ed. Hein Blommenstijn a.o. (Leuven/Paris/Dudley: Peeters, 2008), pp. 109-121. 
33 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas est, 27. 
38          Peter Jonkers 
temporal sphere,” and therefore it refrains from imposing these 
principles directly on modern, by definition pluralist societies. Hence, 
when it comes to interpreting the contingent sphere of day-to-day 
politics in the light of the Church’s social teaching, and directing 
political action on the basis of this teaching, the Church relies on the 
deliberative capacities of (Christian) politicians and members of civil 
society at large. Their task is to find a balance between the fundamental 
principles of social teaching and the contingent opportunities and 
constraints of civil societies, thereby accepting that it will differ from 
society to society. 
 
The Fate of Wisdom in Modernity 
 
In the previous sections, it has become clear that ancient philosophy 
and Christian faith, notwithstanding their substantial differences, have 
served throughout antiquity and a major part of the Middle Ages as 
schools of wisdom, educating people, through corporeal and above all 
spiritual exercises, in a specific way of life in pursuit of wisdom. 
Besides educating people in the contemplation of the highest truths 
(theoretical wisdom), the aim of these exercises was to train them in 
practical wisdom, which according to Aristotle comes down to finding 
again and again the right balance between general rules and contingent, 
particular situations. In the light of these illustrious and longstanding 
wisdom traditions it is all the more surprising that (practical) wisdom 
has lost so much of its respectability and plausibility since the rise of 
modernity. It is crucial to examine the causes of this development if we 
want to retrieve the role of wisdom traditions as a response to the global 
crisis of meaning. 
A first, partial explanation of the declining impact of the ancient 
schools of wisdom has to do with the success of Christianity. “Since the 
end of antiquity, and with respect to pagan philosophies, Christian 
revealed theology has replaced philosophy and it has absorbed at the 
same time ancient philosophical discourse and ancient philosophical 
life.” 34  Christian theology employed philosophical concepts that had 
been studied throughout antiquity, in particular by Aristotelian and 
Neoplatonic commentators. These concepts were needed to solve the 
theological problems that were raised by Christian doctrine, such as the 
notions of essence and hypostasis (for the doctrine of the Trinity), of 
nature (for the doctrine of the Incarnation), and of substance (for the 
doctrine of transubstantiation). As a result of this employment, Christian 
theology reduced ancient philosophy to its purely theoretical aspect, so 
                                                             
34 Hadot, La philosophie comme manière de vivre, p. 181. See also Idem, 
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, pp. 379f. 
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that it gradually lost its character as a spiritual way of life. Instead, 
Christian faith became the only one and true philosophy, and adopted 
the existential aspects of ancient philosophy. In other words, Christian 
faith became a spiritual, more specifically ascetic and mystic way of life, 
thereby recapturing a Christianized version of the spiritual exercises and 
certain mystical themes of ancient philosophy.35 
However, the above does not account for the fact that, in the course 
of the middle ages, Christian theology too became more and more a 
theoretical affair, and lost contact with practical wisdom. For a concrete 
example of this development, one only has to compare the existential 
and autobiographical character of many of Augustine’s writings, 
especially his Confessiones, with the theoretical, academic character of 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. Important factors that contributed 
to turning theology into a theoretical discipline were the foundation of 
the universities from the late eleventh century onward and the 
introduction of (translations of the works of) Aristotle in Western 
Europe, a century later. In the academic philosophical curriculum, which 
had to be completed before entering the faculty of theology, students 
familiarized themselves with philosophical concepts that served as 
instruments for the theoretical clarification of Christian doctrine, mostly 
through studying commentaries on Aristotle’s works. This scholastic 
method of teaching philosophy, which had already separated 
philosophical discourse from philosophy as a way of life,36 had a similar 
effect on the nature of theology and the way in which it was taught. In 
sum, this evolution turned not only philosophy, but also theology into a 
primarily theoretical discipline. Because a (neo-)scholastic kind 
theology remained predominant till mid twentieth century, and had a 
special status in many faculties of philosophy and theology, 37  the 
theoretical, c.q. doctrinal character of these disciplines was strengthened 
                                                             
35 Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, pp. 382f. According to Hadot, 
the Christianized spiritual exercises have been adopted by the monasteries, and 
partly by the laity; examples are the examination of conscience, the meditation 
of death (memento mori), the exercises to imagine hell etc. See Hadot, La 
philosophie comme manière de vivre, p. 182. 
36 Hadot notes that, in the medieval facultas artium, philosophy continued to 
enjoy a relative autonomy, which led some philosophers to rediscover, through 
their commentaries on Aristotle, the idea of philosophy as a spiritual way of life, 
independent from theology. However, these ideas were not well received by the 
theologians and the ecclesiastical authorities, since they opened the possibility 
that humans could become blissful through a purely philosophical 
contemplation. See Hadot, La philosophie comme manière de vivre, p. 183. 
37 Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, p. 388. 
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and solidified further. In general, this situation led to an ever stronger 
emphasis on the doctrinal aspects of Christian faith as such.38 
Yet it has to be noted that the idea of philosophy as a spiritual way 
of life was not lost completely in modernity, but continued to be 
practiced, although this was done by philosophers who did not have a 
formal position at a university, and often as a reaction against academic 
philosophy. One can think of Petrarch, who refused to call the professors 
at the university philosophers, and reserved this name for those who 
authenticated their teaching with their deeds. Other notable examples of 
people who continued to do philosophy as a way of life were Erasmus, 
Montaigne, and Spinoza,39 and in the twentieth century Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein.40 In the context of this paper, I especially want to draw the 
attention to the philosophy of Descartes. The simple fact that he gave his 
most important philosophical work the title Meditationes, well aware of 
the fact that it referred to the illustrious examples of ancient and 
Christian spirituality, shows that he considered philosophy not as a 
purely theoretical, academic discipline, but as a spiritual exercise. 
Moreover, the direct and personal way in which Descartes addresses his 
readers shows that he wanted them to engage in the spiritual exercise he 
was undertaking. Let me, by way of illustration, quote the first sentence 
of the third meditation: 
 
I will now shut my eyes, block my ears, cut off all my senses. I will 
regard all my mental images of bodily things as empty, false and 
worthless (if I could, I would clear them out of my mind altogether). 
I will get into conversation with myself, examine myself more 
                                                             
38 See Peter Jonkers, “From Rational Doctrine to Christian Wisdom,” in A 
Catholic Minority Church in a World of Seekers, ed. Staf Hellemans and Peter 
Jonkers (Washington DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 
2015), pp. 168-172. 
39 Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, pp. 394ff. 
40 Even Hegel, who was the strongest protagonist of the systematic character 
of philosophy in the history of Western thinking, explicitly defines philosophy 
as a way of life in one of his (early) course manuscripts: “As regards the general 
need for philosophy, we try to clarify this need in the form of an answer to the 
question, which relationship has philosophy to life? This question is identical 
with the question: to what extent is philosophy practical? Since the true need for 
philosophy comes eventually down to that one learns to live from it and through 
it.” See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Schriften. Band 5: 
Schriften und Entwürfe (1799-1808) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), p. 261. 
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deeply, and try in this way gradually to know myself more 
intimately.41 
 
In a similar vein, Descartes’ letters to princes Elisabeth of Sweden 
are exemplars of spiritual guidance. Yet, on the other hand, Descartes 
rejected all ancient and medieval schools of wisdom, and wanted to start 
“from scratch” with his philosophical explorations. In his Discours de la 
méthode he is very explicit about this: he likens 
 
the moral writings of the ancient pagans […] to very proud and 
magnificent palaces built only on sand and mud. They praise the 
virtues, making them appear more admirable than anything else in 
the world; but they don’t adequately explain how to tell when 
something is a virtue, and often what they call by this fine name 
‘virtue’ is merely an instance of callousness, or vanity, or despair—or 
parricide!42 
 
This takes us to a final and perhaps most decisive factor that 
determined the fate of philosophy as a pursuit of wisdom in the course of 
modern philosophy, an evolution that I propose to label as “the 
scientification of wisdom.” Again, the philosophy of Descartes is 
paradigmatic in this respect. The wider context of above quote from the 
Discours de la méthode shows that Descartes not only wanted to start 
philosophy from scratch and on his own, but also that his aim was to 
found it once and for all on a solid, unshakeable basis, this in contrast to 
the sandy and muddy foundations on which the ancient schools of 
philosophy rested. In other words, Descartes wanted to get rid of the 
contingency and fragility, which characterize practical wisdom, and 
replace it by a new kind of wisdom that is the product of robust, 
scientific knowledge, founded on the mathematical method. Hence, he 
takes the fundamental decision, with far-reaching consequences, to 
expand the mathematical method to all other disciplines (an approach 
called “mathesis universalis”). This leads to a radical redefinition of 
philosophy as scientific in the strictest sense of the word. Because is 
rests on an indubitable and absolutely clear foundation, philosophy is 
able to produce a knowledge that has the same degree of certitude and 
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[Edition Adam et Tannery]. Tome VII: Meditationes de prima philosophia 
(Paris: Vrin, 1996), p. 34. 
42  René DescartesError! Bookmark not defined., Oeuvres de Descartes 
[Edition Adam et Tannery]. Tome VI: Discours de la méthode (Paris: Vrin, 
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clarity as mathematics. Hence, it can serve as the groundwork of all 
(other) sciences. 
For the fate of wisdom in modernity it is vital to note that Descartes 
redefines the word wisdom and identifies it with scientific knowledge. 
 
By wisdom is to be understood not merely prudence in the 
management of affairs [which was the habitual definition of practical 
wisdom], but a perfect knowledge of all that man can know, as well 
for the conduct of his life as for the preservation of his health and the 
discovery of all the arts, and that knowledge to serve these ends must 
necessarily be deduced from first causes.43 
 
Therefore, if one wants to reach the highest degree of wisdom, one 
needs, first of all, a perfect knowledge of all things, and this can only be 
obtained if one starts from the principles, taking into consideration that 
they “are very clear, and […] that we can deduce all other truths from 
them.” 44  This shows how the Cartesian method of the mathesis 
universalis has affected the very nature of philosophy, including 
practical wisdom. Descartes compares his new, strictly deductive idea of 
philosophy with 
 
a tree, of which metaphysics is the root, physics the trunk, and all the 
other sciences the branches that grow out of this trunk, which are 
reduced to three principal, namely, medicine, mechanics, and ethics. 
By the science of morals, I understand the highest and most perfect 
which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the other sciences, is the 
last degree of wisdom.45 
 
The above shows that Descartes follows the line of thought, defined 
by Aristotle and followed by Thomas Aquinas and other medieval 
philosophers and theologians, according to which theoretical philosophy, 
in particular the scientific knowledge of the first causes and principles of 
things, is the highest form of wisdom. Yet, at the same time, Descartes 
distinguishes himself from Aristotle, because he rejects the distinction 
between theoretical and practical wisdom, and reduces the latter to the 
former. Descartes’ comparison of the whole of philosophy with a tree 
shows that practical wisdom has indeed become a derivative of scientific 
knowledge. The implication of this reduction is that a crucial aspect of 
the Aristotelian idea of practical wisdom, namely to find a balance 
                                                             
43 René Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes [Edition Adam et Tannery]. Tome 
IX/2: Principes de la philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 1996), p. 2. 
44 Descartes, Principes de la philosophie, p .9. 
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between universal rules and contingent, particular actions, and the 
acknowledgement of the inevitable fragility of practical wisdom fades 
away. Descartes is convinced that the certainty and univocity that 
characterize the mathesis universalis also count for the whole of reality, 
so that, eventually, there is no contingency anymore. This means that 
practical wisdom is meant to be elevated to the rank of scientific 
knowledge. In Descartes’ view, this results eventually in a so-called 
definitive science of morals, which consists in a direct and univocal 
application of a limited number of absolutely clear and indubitable 
scientific principles to all particular existential situations, basically in the 
same way as the laws of motion apply to the interaction of all physical 
objects. 
The Cartesian program to reduce practical wisdom to scientific 
knowledge remained paradigmatic in the course of the history of modern 
philosophy. Prominent examples in this respect are Leibniz’ definition 
of wisdom as “a perfect science of all those things that are in the reach 
of the human heart,”46 Fichte’s project to replace philosophy as the love 
of wisdom by the doctrine of science, 47  and Hegel’s programmatic 
statement that “to help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to 
the goal where it can lay aside the title “love of knowing” and be actual 
knowing […] is what I have set myself to do.”48 In twentieth century 
philosophy one can refer to the project of the Vienna Circle to develop a 
“scientific worldview”. 
The practical translation of this paradigm was scientism, which was 
a dominant trend in Western societies during the end of the 19th and the 
first half of the 20th century, and which continues to be quite influential 
in our times. Scientism’s central claim is that scientific rationality is able 
to solve all moral and existential questions of humankind in an 
objective, scientific way, from how to define and evaluate social 
progress to offering a solution to the more fundamental problems of 
human freedom and destiny. This shows that scientism styles itself as 
the definitive instantiation of practical wisdom on a purely scientific 
basis, claiming to be able to answer all the questions of substantial 
meaning. However, in the course of the twentieth century, it became 
more and more evident that scientism failed to live up to its 
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expectations.49 Its claims turned out to be overly optimistic because of 
the enormous complexity of all major societal and existential questions, 
such as how to solve the ecological crisis in a fair way, how to divide 
wealth justly, how to prevent mass-killings, how to evaluate the practical 
implications of fundamental existential notions like freedom, respect, 
solidarity, love etc. Moreover, scientific and technological developments 
have confronted people with a lot of new existential problems, which 
cannot be solved in a purely scientific way, as the intricate moral 
questions about the beginning and end of human life show. Finally, 
scientism’s redefinition of all kinds of existential problems in a so-called 
objective and scientific way turned out to be disruptive for the life-
world, which is precisely the domain where the need for practical 
wisdom is most acute. 50  In sum, scientism’s claim to serve as the 
definitive answer to all questions of substantial meaning turned out to be 
not only unfeasible, but also fundamentally wrongheaded.  
 
Practical Wisdom as a Response to the Loss of Substantial Meaning 
 
After the disillusion about the promises of scientism, the 
fundamental question crops up whether a retrieval of wisdom traditions 
can be a response to the above problems. In order to introduce this 
response it is first of all necessary to examine the nature of the loss of 
substantial meaning more closely. It comes as no surprise that this loss is 
the flipside of the success of scientism, in particular of the fact that 
scientism has led to a marginalization of all wisdom traditions, reducing 
them to contingent opinions because of their non-scientific character.51 
Important factors that have contributed to the loss of substantial meaning 
in our times are the processes of “bricolage” and consumerism. The term 
bricolage refers to the fact that the life-styles of many people are the 
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result of tinkering, of fitting elements of various wisdom-traditions into 
an individual religious patchwork. Whether or not this bricolage is 
successful only depends on one’s subjective preferences, on whether one 
feels good with them. The term consumerism is used to refer to the fact 
that many people’s attitude towards wisdom traditions is similar to that 
of consumers in a supermarket: in the enormous shopping-mall of 
today’s globalized culture, they pick and choose what meets best their 
personal needs. Obviously, all these life-style products try to seduce the 
consumer into buying. The result is a generalized eclecticism, in which 
people not only have lost contact with traditional schools of wisdom and 
the substantial meanings that they foster, but also are reluctant to let 
themselves influence by these schools. 52  Instead, they are constantly 
busy constructing and reconstructing the content and meaning of their 
lives, gaining information about whether there is anything attractive in 
the latest new trends, desperately hoping to get likes” from their peers 
for their lifestyle, and always afraid of being out of vogue. 
Although most people welcome these developments, the loss of 
substantial meaning confronts them from time to time with the feeling of 
being uprooted, of living in a fragmented and continuously changing 
world void of stable orientation-points. In other words, many people in 
our times have a strong, but indefinite longing without substantial 
belonging. They express this by using keywords like conversion and 
pilgrimage to characterise their existence. However, in my view, this 
restlessness only shows that they are caught between their aversion to 
commit themselves to substantial traditions and their longing for such 
commitments for the sake of giving orientation to their lives.  
In order to explain this restlessness further, one can refer to 
Durkheim, according to whom normative uncertainty is latently present 
in all modern societies. Individual and societal moral norms are not 
derived anymore from an eternal divine order or an immutable natural 
law, but depend on societal recognition. Moreover, the rise of expressive 
individualism has further strengthened the idea that moral norms are 
nothing but (social) constructions, thus enhancing their instability. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the great variety of norms and values and 
the speed, with which they are changing cause a dominant experience of 
normative uncertainty. Another important cause of this experience has to 
do with the fact that some of the predictions of the modernization theory 
on moral issues have not come true. This theory predicted the emergence 
and diffusion of an ethos of individualism and instrumentalism in all 
modern societies, as well as the rise of a procedural, rational, and 
universalist ethics, combined with the fading away of all kinds of social 
discrimination. This would eventually lead to a society, in which cultural 
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and religious differences would be irrelevant, so that conflicts over 
substantial values would belong to a distant past. 
However, in contrast to this prediction we see that traditions, 
religious and secular ones, continue to leave a lasting imprint on the 
lives of people in all European societies. These traditions are especially 
important in those domains where modernization has eroded the 
functional basis of traditional moral rules, without being able to provide 
plausible new ones, such as the care for the sick and elderly. Another 
persisting problem of modern societies is that moral rules, which seem at 
first sight universal and rational, lose their self-evidence when people try 
to apply these rules in particular moral dilemmas.53 What has made this 
problem even worse is the fact that these universal principles tend to 
become ever more formal (or abstract) and procedural, while the moral 
decisions that people have to take in particular situations become more 
and more entangled. Finally and most importantly, even the strongest 
defenders of liberal, modern democracies have recognized that 
procedural moral principles lack the motivational potential that people 
need to act in accordance with these principles. 54  In sum, there is a 
widening gap between the universal, but formal moral principles of 
modernity and the substantial values that people need as guidance in 
their concrete moral behaviour, while at the same time it becomes clear 
that the former have not been able to replace the latter. 
This explains why the question of the crisis of substantial meaning 
is an acute and topical one. As a response to it, Hadot proposes a 
revaluation of schools of (practical) wisdom, religious and secular ones; 
they are a sort of “experimental laboratories,” whose results can be very 
useful to orientate ourselves in life.55 In my view, the reason for their 
importance in our times is that these schools not only educate us in 
discovering and critically examining the principles of practical wisdom 
and their specific implications in different contexts, but also train us to 
find the right balance between these principles and the particular 
situations, in which we have to act. These schools also “employ” so-
called masters of wisdom, who are essential in training people to make 
the transition from book learning to lived wisdom. It goes without 
saying that Christian faith, just like many other religious and secular 
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traditions, is a school of wisdom. Yet, just like was the case in ancient 
times, the contemporary schools of wisdom have to operate in a 
competitive field, so that they have to substantiate that the orientation 
they offer is trustworthy. Only then they will be accepted as contributing 
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